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Artikel ini bertujuan untuk meneliti perspektif gerakan revivalis Islam di Indonesia 
terhadap konsep negara-bangsa dan demokrasi. Istilah gerakan revivalis Islam yang 
digunakan dalam studi ini diantaranya adalah Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), Fron 
Pembela Islam (FPI), Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI), dan Forum Umat Islam (FUI). 
Setelah jatuhnya rezim Presiden Suharto pada tahun 1998, Indonesia telah mengalami 
peningkatan aktivisme Islam yang tujuannya berkisar antara pelaksanaan syariah 
(hukum Islam) dan, sampai batas tertentu, pendirian kembali khilafah Islamiyah 
(negara Islam transnasional). Demi tujuan tersebut, gerakan-gerakan revivalis ini 
telah sering menggelar protes massa, terutama untuk menyikapi kebijakan pemerintah 
Indonesia yang dianggap tidak Islami. Beberapa protes berakhir dengan kekerasan 
sehingga dapat dikatakan bahwa upaya-upaya penerapan syariah dan pendirian negara 
Islam tersebut telah memicu sejumlah konflik di masyarakat Indonesia. Penelitian 
ini mengasumsikan bahwa aktivisme yang berpotensi memicu kekerasan atau konflik 
tersebut bermula dari pemahaman atau penentangan gerakan revivalis ini terhadap 
konsep negara-bangsa dan demokrasi. Atas latar belakang inilah penelitian ini 
dilakukan untuk menganalisis perspektif mereka mengenai konsep negara-bangsa dan 
demokrasi. Penelitian ini berargumen bahwa meskipun gerakan-gerakan revivalis Islam 
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Luhur.
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ini memperjuangan penerapan syariah di Indonesia, mereka memiliki pemahaman 
yang tidak seragam mengenai konsep negara-bangsa dan demokrasi.
Keywords: Indonesia, hukum syariah, khalifah, negara-bangsa, politik Islam, gerakan 
Islam
ABSTRACT
This research examines Indonesian Islamic revivalist movements’ perspectives on 
the concepts of the nation-state and democracy. The Islamic revivalist movements 
studied in this research include Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), Front Pembela Islam 
(FPI), Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI), and Forum Umat Islam (FUI). Following the 
fall of the authoritarian Suharto’s regime in 1998, Indonesia witnessed an escalation 
of Islamic activism whose goals revolve around the implementation of Sharia (Islamic 
law) and, to a certain extent, the reestablishment of a caliphate (transnational Islamic 
state). To this end, revivalist movements have been staging frequent mass protests, 
mainly addressing Indonesian government policies that are deemed un-Islamic. Some 
of the protests have ended violently, which implies that their Sharia and Islamic state 
goals have become a source of conflict in Indonesian society. This research suggests 
that this violent activism stems from different versions of the concept of the nation-
state and democracy, which disagree with broadly accepted definitions. This research 
was conducted against this backdrop to analyze each movements’ perspectives on 
the concept of nation-state and democracy and argues that, despite each movement 
advocating the implementation of Sharia, their understandings of the concepts of the 
nation-state and democracy differ.
Keywords: Indonesia, sharia, caliphate, nation-state, political Islam, Islamic movement
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INTRODUCTION
Since the collapse of Suharto’s regime in 1998, Indonesia has seen a 
rise in Islamic revivalist activism that calls for the implementation of 
Sharia and the establishment of a caliphate. Salim and Azra (2003, 1–2) 
argue that political Islam following the Suharto era has been character-
ized by what is known as the “formalization of Islam,” seen in rising 
demands for the implementation of Islamic law and the mushrooming 
of Islamic revivalist movements such as Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI),1 
Front Pembela Islam (FPI), Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI), and 
Forum Umat Islam (FUI) in various regions across the country. Prior to 
the collapse of the New Order, these movements operated underground 
to avoid the regime’s repression. The toppling of the regime opened up 
1 HTI became public in 2000 and since then has been actively calling for the establishment 
of the caliphate and implementation of the Sharia. In July 2017, Joko Widodo’s administration 
disbanded the organization for basing itself on an ideology that challenges the Pancasila and 
the 1945 Constitution. See Movanita (2017). 
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the political sphere for these movements, allowing them to consistently 
campaign for the implementation of Sharia through collective action, 
such as protests, mass mobilization, statements on media platforms, pe-
titions, and other methods. These movements have discussed a variety 
of issues, from economic concerns such as the rise of gasoline prices 
to pornography, as reflected in the protest against the hosting of Miss 
World. These protests in principle aim to highlight the government’s 
inability to address existing problems while at the same time offering 
Sharia as their solution. 
The term “Islamic revivalist movement” refers to any social move-
ment that aims to revitalize Islamic teachings and its principles in the 
public sphere through involvements in various social activities. Esposito 
and Voll (2001, 39) defined the Islamic revival as the revitalization of 
Islamic teachings and principles throughout the Islamic world, mani-
fested in an increase in piety and the implementation of Islamic ethics 
and culture among Muslims. They regarded the Egypt-based Ikhwanul 
Muslimin2 and Pakistan-based Jamaat al-Islami3 as Islamic revivalist 
movements that aim to establish a system of governance based on 
Sharia in their respective countries. Similarly, Islamic movements in 
Indonesia also hold these aspirations. Several movements have even 
called for the establishment of an Islamic state in Indonesia. However, 
there are also revivalist Islamic organizations that do not engage in 
collective action that aim to challenge the government. 
Other Islamic revivalist organizations include Jamaah Tabligh 
(Preaching Community) and Baitul Mal wat Tamwil (BMT). Jamaat 
Tabligh is a nonpolitical Islamic movement whose main activity is 
dakwah: the call for Muslims to increase their individual piety (Ali 
2003). BMT is a microfinance institution that offers financial services 
2 Ikhwanul Muslimin is generally known as the largest and most influential Islamic movement 
in the Arab world. The movement was established in 1928 by an Egyptian Islamic intellectual 
named Hassan al-Banna. One of the movement’s main objectives is the enforcement of Sharia 
in the public sphere. For further detail, see Husaini (1956) and Mitchell (1969), among others.
3 Jamaat al-Islami was established in Lahore, Pakistan, in 1945 by an Islamic intellectual named 
Abul Ala Maududi. The movement gained popularity and influence in the Indian subcontinent. 
Jamaat al-Islami aims to establish a system of governance based on the Islamic law in Pakistan. 
For further detail, see Nasr (1994; 1996), among others. 
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to small and medium enterprises as well as the poor. The institution 
bases its operations on the principles of Islamic economy and finance 
(Sakai 2008). It is necessary to distinguish the fundamental difference 
between Islamic revivalist organizations that engage in collective action 
such as HTI, FPI, MMI, and FUI and those that do not participate in 
collective action, such as Jamaah Tabligh and BMT. The concept of 
social movements is employed in this research to explain these differ-
ences. The majority of scholars define the main characteristics of social 
movements as involvement in sustainable collective action directed at 
the government, political elites, and their opponents. These collective 
actions usually materialize in the form of mass demonstrations, meet-
ings, rallies, and statements on media platforms, among others, and are 
extra-institutional or extra-parliamentary (Gamson and Mayer 1996, 
283; Tarrow 1998, 4; Tilly 2004, 7). 
The capacity to take part in sustainable collective action against 
the government, political elites, and oppositional groups differentiates 
Islamic revivalist movements such as HTI, FPI, MMI, and FUI from 
nonpolitical Islamic revivalist organizations like Jamaah Tabligh and 
BMT. This also differentiates them from Islamic political parties. One 
may categorize Indonesian Islamic political parties, like Partai Keadilan 
Sejahtera, which emerged from a tarbiyah-based campus organization 
and gained popularity among Muslim students in the 1990s, as an Is-
lamic revivalist movement. This categorization is due to the structure 
and actors of political parties and social movements that often overlap, 
as demonstrated in the structure of the Green Party. However, even 
though these political parties may be regarded as social movements, 
this condition usually applies to parties that originate from social move-
ments, such as the Labor Party. The majority of scholars agree that the 
main difference between social movements and political parties lies 
in the roles they play: while political parties’ main form of political 
activism takes place in formal political institutions, such as the DPR 
or legislature, social movements take part in activism outside of formal 
institutions (Diani 1992, 14–15; Goldstone 2003, 3).
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HTI, FPI, MMI, and FUI are Indonesian Islamic revivalist move-
ments that emerged after the fall of Suharto’s regime in 1998. Since 
they became established, they have engaged in various forms of col-
lective action. HTI is known for its call for an Islamic caliphate. This 
demand is not only a slogan but also packaged as a solution to multidi-
mensional problems that the country has faced since the Asian financial 
crisis in 1997. The crisis began with the depreciation of the Indonesian 
Rupiah to the US Dollar, which caused political and economic instabil-
ity, rocketing commodity prices, mass unemployment, and prolonged 
ethnic and sectarian conflicts in several regions such as Maluku and 
Poso, Central Sulawesi. MMI is a movement that calls for the imple-
mentation of Islamic law (Sharia) in Indonesia. FPI actively participates 
in collective action that advocates the principle of amar ma’ruf nahi 
munkar (enjoining the good and forbidding the wrong) without calling 
for the establishment of the Islamic state in Indonesia. Similar to the 
previously mentioned movements, FUI campaigns for “NKRI Bersya-
riah” or “A Sharia NKRI,” which calls for the implementation of Sharia 
within the framework of Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia (NKRI). 
There are specific differences between the methods of interpretation 
and implementation of Sharia that these movements employ, such as 
stances on the Shia community and electoral participation. However, 
they all generally agree on an urgent need to advocate for the interests 
of Islam and Muslims in Indonesia, as well as revitalize Islamic teach-
ings and principles not only in the private sphere but also in public. 
During their development, the demands of these Islamic revivalist 
movements created social tensions and even horizontal conflicts. For 
example, their agenda to disband the Indonesian Ahmadiyah organiza-
tion by claiming that the organization had strayed from Islam incited 
a social conflict that led to the Monas Incident on June 1st, 2008. This 
incident became a subject of public scrutiny as the clash between the 
Islamic revivalist alliance and the alliance that opposed the disband-
ment of the Indonesian Ahmadiyah injured many people. Furthermore, 
other violent incidents incited by these movements, such as the unrest 
led by FPI in front of DKI’s DPRD building in 2012 and 2014 (Radja 
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2014) and the Ministry of Home Affairs (Tribun News 2012), cannot 
be easily forgotten by the public.
These movements’ agendas to implement the Sharia and establish 
an Islamic caliphate have been criticized and opposed by other ele-
ments of Indonesian society. For example, a young intellectual from 
Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), Zuhairi Misrawi (2007), argued that the con-
cept of a caliphate is not compatible with the concept of NKRI. Agree-
ing with Misrawi, a senior NU figure, Solahuddin Wahid (2008), stated 
that Indonesia’s largest Islamic organization, NU, had agreed that the 
concept of NKRI is absolute. In other words, Indonesia’s Pancasila-
based system of governance, which was agreed upon by the country’s 
founding fathers, cannot be altered. Opposition to the establishment 
of the caliphate and implementation of Sharia begs for an inquiry into 
Islamic revivalist movements’ concepts of democracy and the nation-
state. The Islamic revivalist movements’ desire to implement Sharia 
tends to be accompanied by violence, which undermines political sta-
bility and security. Based on these contexts, this article aims to answer 
the question, “how do the four Indonesian Islamic revivalist movements 
(HTI, FPI, MMI, and FUI) perceive the concepts of democracy and the 
nation-state?” This research employs a qualitative approach to explore 
the concepts of social movements, Islamic revivalism, democracy, and 
the nation-state. This article argues that although all four of the Islamic 
revivalist movements agree on the implementation of Sharia in Indo-
nesia, they differ in their attitudes to the concepts of the nation-state 
and democracy.
R ESEA RCH METHOD
This research employs a qualitative approach. Unlike quantitative re-
search studies, qualitative research employs an interpretative paradigm 
that views social phenomena as social constructs and thus adopts an in-
ductive method that aims to produce theories, not test or verify hypoth-
eses. A case study, which is an intensive, holistic description and analysis 
of a single entity, phenomenon, or social unit (Merriam 1998; Creswell 
2003), best serves the specific characteristics of this qualitative study. 
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This research is particularistic as it focuses on a specific phenomenon. 
In this research, four Indonesian Islamic revivalist movements—HTI, 
FPI, MMI, and FUI—are the focus of the study. Data on each move-
ments’ daily activities were obtained through field research, where the 
author directly observed and interacted with members and leaders of 
these movements. Interviews were also conducted with members and 
leaders of the movements to obtain firsthand information that cannot be 
accessed through literature or media. A literature review was conducted 
to provide valuable information on certain aspects of this research. 
Data were therefore obtained through observation, literature review, 
and interviews, to complement and balance each other. 
CONCEP TUA L A ND A NA LY TICA L FR A MEWOR K
Social Movements
A large part of social movement study has focused on collective action, 
particularly research carried out in Western societies. Social move-
ments are usually categorized as old social movements, such as the 
labor movement, and new social movements, such as feminism, ecol-
ogy, and anti-war movement. The emergence of old social movements 
happened in the context of conflicting relations between capital owners 
vis-à-vis labor, as emphasized by orthodox Marxism. New social move-
ments employ a different perspective from that of the economistic or 
materialist Marxist. While building a more comprehensive analysis of 
new social movements, scholars have set aside the classic determinism 
of the capital-labor conflict that has underpinned the framework of 
old social movements in postindustrialized economies since the 1960s. 
The main characteristics of the new generation of social movements 
differ from those of the old labor movements. New social movements 
pay more attention to social change or transformation than economic 
transformation (Buechler 1995, 453; Porta and Diani 1999, 11–13). Scott 
(1990, 16–17) attributes three characteristics to new social movements. 
Firstly, new social movements emphasize lifestyle and values rather 
than citizenship issues and political power. Secondly, they are an in-
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separable element of civil society. Thirdly, new social movements aim to 
bring about social change through socialization into new social values 
and alternative lifestyles. 
Although scholars may employ different emphasizes when defining 
social movements, their main focus has been on social movements 
during the postindustrial economic era. In contrast to Scott’s (1990) 
characteristics of social movements, other scholars have provided other 
descriptions of new social movements, with varying perspectives on 
typology, structure, and strategy. For example, the majority of scholars 
stress the most important elements of social movements, such as the 
capacity to take part in sustainable collective action against authorities, 
political elites, and opponents. Their collective action may include mass 
demonstrations, mass mobilization, petitions, and media statements 
usually by extra-institutional means (Gamson and Mayer 1996, 283; 
Tarrow 1998, 4; Tilly 2004, 7). Porta and Diani’s (1999, 13) definition 
places an emphasis on sustainable collective action or challenges as a 
necessary requirement. A similar definition is used by Oberschall (1993, 
2) who defined social movements as a collective means to bring societal 
change that impacts human lives on a large scale.
Islamic Revivalism
As touched upon above in the introduction, the term “Islamic revival-
ism” refers to the means to revitalize Islamic teachings and principles 
in the public sphere through protests against authorities, political elites, 
and/or groups with opposing ideologies. Islamic revivalism involves the 
revitalization of Islamic teachings and principles across the Islamic 
world, manifested in an increase in piety and the implementation of 
Islamic principles. This spirit is reflected in the activisms of the Ikh-
wanul Muslimin in Egypt, the Jamaat al-Islami in Pakistan, and the 
transnational movement Hizbut Tahrir (HT), among others. They aim 
to implement a system of Sharia law and governance in their respective 
countries. This aspiration to implement Sharia is also shared by Islamic 
revivalist movements in Indonesia and manifested in the continuous 
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call for the total implementation of Sharia and, to some extent, the 
establishment of an Islamic state (Esposito and Voll 2001, 39). 
Democracy and the Nation-State
The broadly accepted definition of modern democracy is “a system of 
governance in which rulers are held accountable for their actions to 
their citizens, who have chosen and mandated political power to them 
through elections.” (Schmitter and Karl 1991, 114). The elements that 
make up democracy include the following: 1) citizens’ equal participa-
tion in politics; 2) popular sovereignty, or as said by the Latin phrase 
Vox Populi, Vox Dei, which translates to “the voice of the people is the 
voice of God”; and 3) guaranteed checks and balances between execu-
tive and legislative bodies (Schmitter and Karl 1991, 114). Many Islamic 
revivalist movements oppose the concept of democracy and view it as 
foreign to Islam. 
R ESULTS A ND A NA LYSIS
HTI’s Perception of the Concepts of 
Democracy and the Nation-State
Nation-states are called “imagined political communities” that are lim-
ited and sovereign. Nation-states are limited because they have finite 
borders. Beyond those borders exist other nation-states. Nation-states are 
sovereign because the concept was born during the Age of Enlighten-
ment and Revolution, which destroyed the legitimacy of the divinely 
ordained, hierarchal dynastic realm. The “sovereign and limited” char-
acteristic of the nation-state means that, unlike a monarch, no nation-
state can claim sovereignty over other nation-states. Furthermore, the 
sovereignty of most modern nation-states is secular or does not originate 
from divine rule. The role of religion and its institutions has been 
radically eliminated and is regarded as a personal matter in the private 
sphere. These characteristics are incompatible with the concept of a 
caliphate. The concept of territorial borders used by a caliphate also 
differs from that of the nation-state. The caliphate can extend territorial 
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borders through annexation and seizures through concessions due to 
loss in war (Yoyok Tindyo, HTI’s public relations officer for the Yogya-
karta chapter, December 3rd, 2008). Secularism also has no place in a 
caliphate’s system of law and governance, as a caliphate bases its laws 
on God’s orders, which regulate both the private and public spheres. 
The Islamic creed (aqidah) the foundation of the state. There shall be 
no government structure, accountability, or any governmental aspect 
that does not base itself on Islam. The Islamic creed is also the source 
of all state laws and the Sharia. There shall be no law or qanun that 
is not based on Islamic creed (An-Nabhani 2002, 115). 
A caliphate sits in stark contrast to a nation-state. The difference in-
evitably results in HTI’s disapproval of other concepts or ideologies 
such as nationalism and democracy that are regarded as foreign to Is-
lam. For example, nationalism is generally viewed as a product of the 
nation-state and broadly understood as one’s sense of loyalty or sense of 
belonging to a nation-state. Nationalism is deemed necessary and will 
continue to exist as long as the nation-state. Only in nation-states are 
the concepts of shared history, myths, and legends found and instilled 
through mass socialization and media to promote attachment to the 
nation-state (Smith 1999; 2004). To HTI, the concepts of nation-state 
and nationalism are problematic. Not only is nationalism foreign to 
Islam, it has also been the source of conflicts between Muslims world-
wide. The nation-state and nationalism divide Muslims into different 
political entities. This condition impedes the establishment of a single 
political entity that could unite the 1.6 billion Muslims around the 
world, named a caliphate.
In addition to opposing the concept of the nation-state and national-
ism, HTI also opposes the concept of Western democracy. From the 
elements of democracy mentioned above, the second element that HTI 
disagreed with was the concept of popular sovereignty. To HTI, sover-
eignty should not originate from the people, but Sharia. To them, Islam 
has provided its followers with a set of rules and laws that encompass 
every aspect of life. HTI also views the practice of modern democracy 
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as equivalent to secularism, where almost every decision about public 
affairs is made by the people through their representatives in the parlia-
ment. In other words, the laws in democracies are not based on Sharia. 
On the contrary, these rules and laws are made by the majority. HTI 
authored a book that specifically critiqued the principles of democracy, 
which is regarded as a “kafeer system.”
Democracy is a law system created by humans to rebel against mon-
archs who claimed divine right to rule and oppress the people. De-
mocracy is founded by humans and thus has no relation to revelation 
nor religion (Zalloom 1995, 5). 
Despite its condemnation of the secular aspect of democracy, HTI did 
not view other elements of democracy, such as elections, as oppositional 
to HTI’s principles. This part analyzes HTI’s attitude toward participa-
tion in elections and why the organization never evolved into a political 
party that campaigned for votes in Indonesian elections despite the HT 
international umbrella organization’s status as a political party in the 
Middle East.4 Some scholars argue that the international HT actively 
chooses to remain as an extra-parliamentary movement (Mayer 2004, 
22; Arifin 2005, 160; Karagiannis 2006, 266; Mandaville 2007, 111). 
However, HT nominated several candidates in the Jordanian elections 
in 1954 and 1956. The second leader of HT, Abdul Qadim Zallum, 
competed for a seat in parliament, albeit unsuccessfully. During the 
second election, Ahmad al-Daur was HT’s only candidate to win a seat 
in the Jordanian parliament (Cohen 1982, 209–210; Commins 1991, 
196; Farouki 1996, 6–7; Lust-Okar 2001, 558; Moaddel 2002, 541).
Due to its unglamorous experience in the past elections and repres-
sive measures by the state toward its members, HT shifted its stance 
on elections from participatory to nonparticipatory. In the Jordanian 
political landscape, the shift was evident when HT boycotted the coun-
try’s election in 1989, which was the country’s first election since the 
Jordanian government abolished all political parties in 1957. HT said 
4 The international HT states itself as a political party. See HT’s official website, “Hizb ut-
Tahrir,” at http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.info. 
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they did not perceive any benefit from participating in the elections and 
refused to acknowledge the Jordanian Constitution. This was also the 
main reason behind HT’s nomination of two candidates in the 1954 and 
1956 elections and their boycotting of the 1989 elections. The country’s 
election laws that were passed in 1986 also became HT’s main reason 
for refusing to participate in the 1989 elections. The laws stated that 
every candidate in the election had to declare they had no affiliation 
with any political parties whose platform or ideology did not support the 
state’s laws. In the 1950s, HT was not subject to that restriction (Farouki 
1996, 157; Lust-Okar 2001, 558). 
HT’s decision to avoid participating in elections differed to HTI’s 
stance. During HTI’s international conference on the caliphate in Jakar-
ta on August 12th, 2007, HTI’s spokesperson Ismail Yusanto stated that 
HTI does not refuse to participate in elections as the international HT 
itself nominated candidates during the 1950s’ Jordanian elections. HTI 
believes that Islam permits participation in elections (mubah) (Interview 
with Muhammad Ismail Yusanto, March 12, 2008). Ismail stated that 
electoral participation is a procedure compatible with the concept of 
wakaalah or representation in Islam. The concept consists of four ele-
ments: 1) wakil (representative), 2) muwaakil (the represented), 3) ‘amal 
(the deed carried out on behalf of the muwaakil, and 4) ‘aqad (contract 
or agreement between the wakil and muwaakil). From these four ele-
ments, Ismail emphasized ‘amal as a very important aspect because it 
determines the nature of the representation. If the deed is a good deed, 
thus the representation is good. Conversely, if the deed is bad, then the 
representation is bad. Ismail stressed that elections themselves cannot 
be regarded as right or wrong as they are merely methods for choosing 
one’s representatives, while the main duties of these representatives are 
to transform parliament into a place of dakwah, to monitor the execu-
tive, and, most importantly, to fully implement Sharia.5 
5 For further detail on HTI’s mobilization strategy and rhetoric, see Osman (2010a; 2010b) and 
Munabari (2010), among others.
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MMI’s Perceptions of the Concepts of 
Democracy and the Nation-State
MMI opposes the concept of democracy and views it as incompatible 
with Islamic teaching. Like HTI, this opposition is based on the belief 
that the concept is foreign to Islam and not in accordance with Sharia.6 
However, MMI does not demand the establishment of a caliphate or 
an Islamic state in Indonesia as MMI prioritizes the full implementa-
tion of Sharia in Indonesia over the former. This stance is reflected 
in MMI’s campaigns, where the call for the enforcement of Sharia is 
always written on banners and leaflets and announced as its agenda. 
The use of the term “Islamic state” has never been the movement’s 
agenda (Shadiq 2016). 
To MMI, democracy can be categorized into two definitions. The 
first definition is democracy as an ideology. As an ideology, democracy 
is viewed as incompatible with Islam. MMI regards those who ascribe 
to this ideology as musyrik, which is literally translated as those who 
worship a god other than the One God Almighty. The second defini-
tion regards democracy as a method that is permitted (mubah). Islam 
permits the use of this method to elect rulers or leaders. However, 
Muslims must use this method to fight for the interest of Muslims by 
choosing leaders who commit to the institutionalization of Sharia in 
Indonesia. Although democracy is permitted, MMI warns the public 
that democracy generally clashes with Islam. 
As stated in the Holy Quran, democracy taints Islam and Muslims. It 
is the nature of those who practice democracy to eventually break their 
promises [to support Islamic interests and causes] (Arrahmah 2013).
MMI’s attitude toward participation in elections is similar to that of 
HTI. MMI regards democratic elections as a method for choosing a 
ruler. Thus, MMI views elections as permitted by Islam (mubah). This 
method, based on a form of consensus and voting, was also used dur-
ing the era of Khulafaur Rasyidin. However, the status of elections as 
6 For further detail on MMI, see Bruiniessen (2002) and Fealy (2004), among others.
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permitted in Islam does not translate into MMI encouraging its fol-
lowers to vote in elections. Like HTI, MMI is concerned with several 
social and political factors that influence elections in Indonesia’s con-
temporary political context. These factors have resulted in MMI’s high 
level of distrust in the concept and practice of democracy in Indonesia. 
Furthermore, MMI objected to the decision made by the FUI coalition 
that MMI joined to explicitly support the nomination of Jusuf Kalla 
and Wiranto as President and Vice President during the 2009 election. 
MMI’s dissatisfaction was due to FUI’s lack of consultation with MMI 
prior to announcing their support (Interview with Abu Jibril, December 
19, 2013). 
MMI released a press statement about its stance on electoral par-
ticipation before the 2014 election. This press release further clarified 
MMI’s attitude toward elections. There are two reasons behind MMI’s 
refusal to participate in elections. Firstly, MMI points to the absence 
of Indonesian political parties that base their platform purely on Islam 
and aim to achieve the implementation of Sharia. Secondly, the par-
ticipation and competition between political parties in elections are 
designed to embolden the system of shirk (the deification of other enti-
ties beside God), which renders the system incompatible with Islam. 
MMI deems the shirk system as equivalent to the secular democratic 
system that separates the state from religion. For these reasons, MMI 
calls for every Muslim to choose political parties whose ideology does 
not violate Sharia and vote for presidential and legislative candidates 
who unequivocally support the institutionalization of Sharia in Indo-
nesia (Muttaqin 2014). 
Like HTI, when MMI calls for Muslims to support political parties 
and legislative candidates who support the formalization of Sharia, this 
is mere rhetoric. There are no political parties nor members of the leg-
islature who support the formalization of Sharia in Indonesia. Should 
MMI explicitly announce its oppositional stance to elections and call 
for abstention, MMI would violate the country’s election laws, which 
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prohibits individuals from encouraging other individuals to abstain in 
elections.7 
FPI’s Perceptions of the Concepts of 
Democracy and the Nation-State
Unlike HTI that campaigns for the full implementation of Sharia in 
Indonesia, FPI is not interested in the formalization of Sharia. FPI’s 
leaders believe that “enjoining the good and forbidding the wrong” 
(‘amar ma’ruf nahi munkar) is also a part of the call for Sharia.8 An FPI 
leader said that essentially Indonesia has implemented laws that are in 
accordance with Sharia, such as the laws on Islamic banking, Islamic 
marriages, and zakat. FPI believes that, although the implementation 
of Sharia in Indonesia is important, it needs to be implemented gradu-
ally. The complete formalization of Sharia is not FPI’s utmost priority. 
Furthermore, unlike HTI that urges the establishment of a caliphate 
or an Islamic state, FPI already regards Indonesia as an Islamic country 
due to 1) the majority of citizens being Muslim; 2) Muslims’ freedom to 
exercise their religion, and 3) the government’s current implementation 
of several Islamic laws. 
In essence, the establishment of an Islamic state in Indonesia is un-
necessary as Indonesia is already an Islamic country. Indonesia has 
already implemented several laws that are in accordance to the Sharia 
such as the law on Islamic banking, the law on Islamic marriages, and 
zakat. It is correct that the complete implementation of the Sharia is 
important, but it is something that we should implement gradually 
(Interview with Jafar Shodiq, November 4, 2013).
In contrast to HTI, FPI views supporting candidates in presidential or 
regional elections as an effective method to “enjoin the good and forbid 
the wrong.” However, this support is conditional, in that the elected 
candidate must support “enjoining the good and forbidding the bad” 
7 See Election Law (Undang-Undang Pemilu) No. 10 2008 that stipulates any action or means 
to prevent an individual from casting their vote as illegal and subject to punishment. 
8 For further detail on FPI, see Jahroni (2008) and Ng (2005), among others. 
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and fight for FPI’s programs, such as eliminating bad deeds (disobedi-
ence in Islam) from society, and disbanding the allegedly astray Indo-
nesian Ahmadiyah organization. An example of this support was FPI’s 
endorsement of Juruf Kalla dan Wiranto during the 2009 presidential 
election. FPI also supported several gubernatorial candidates in several 
regions, such as Fauzi Bowo and Nachrowi Ramli in the 2012 DKI 
Jakarta gubernatorial election, Ahmad Heryawan and Deddy Mizwar 
in the 2013 West Java gubernatorial election, and Anies Baswedan and 
Sandiaga Uno in the 2017 DKI Jakarta gubernatorial election. Prior to 
officially deciding and announcing their support for certain candidates, 
FPI usually holds meetings with the candidates and asks if they are will-
ing to support FPI’s “anti-bad-deeds” programs. If the candidates agree, 
FPI then calls upon their members and followers to support and vote 
for the candidates. In many circumstances, FPI not only releases state-
ments in support of the candidates but also mobilizes its members and 
followers to aid the candidates’ victory (Interview with Novel Bamuk-
min, November 29, 2013; Interview with Muhsin Al-Attas, December 
28, 2013). Sometimes, FPI decides not to support any candidate if no 
candidates agree to support FPI’s programs, as seen during the 2009 
Depok regional election. FPI believed that no candidates were willing 
to disband the Indonesian Ahmadiyah during this election (Burhani 
2009).
FPI’s willingness to endorse candidates in elections shows that FPI 
does not view modern democracy as incompatible with the interests 
of Indonesian Muslims. Unlike HTI that opposes elections, FPI re-
gards elections as a means to facilitate the realization of “enjoining the 
good and forbidding the wrong,” so long as the candidates commit to 
supporting the principle. This condition explains why the agreement 
between FPI and electoral candidates takes place prior to FPI’s official 
endorsement of them. Although not every candidate supported wins 
the election, FPI’s attitude toward elections in Indonesia during the 
Reformation era shows that not every Islamic revivalist movement that 
has supported the implementation of Sharia since the Suharto era has 
the same characteristics as the transnational HTI. Despite many of 
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FPI’s mass demonstrations being mobilized to protest against the gov-
ernment, FPI also works with the government to conduct humanitarian 
and social work, disaster relief programs, and social development. For 
example, FPI signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) along 
with the Ministry of Social Affairs in 2012 to conduct the “Renova-
tion of Inhabitable Houses” that aimed to renovate housing in areas of 
poverty (Ministry of Social Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia 2012). 
On a practical level, FPI has two congruent yet oppositional roles. 
The first role is to criticize its opponents, such as the Indonesian Ah-
madiyah organization and the government, both at the local and na-
tional levels. The second is to provide social services to people in need. 
The realization of the second role is supported by the formation of 
specific institutions for the purpose within FPI’s structure, such as the 
Hilal Merah Indonesia (HILMI) division that was specifically formed to 
assist victims of natural disasters and provide humanitarian and social 
services to those in need. 
When we conduct mass protests towards the government, it does not 
mean we loathe them. In contrary, we are aiming to correct their poli-
cies. We support the government if they implement the right policies. 
In reality, we work with the government to revitalize houses for the 
poor. In addition to that, our activities do not only revolve around 
“forbidding and preventing the wrong.” We also help assist the victims 
of natural disasters through HILMI (Interview with Slamet Maarif, 
November 21, 2013).
Woodward, Yahya, Rohmaniyah, Coleman, Lundry, and Amin (2014, 
153) argued that FPI has both a “civil” and “uncivil” face. The civil face 
portrays FPI as the government’s partner in restraining movements that 
are perceived to have gone astray, such as the Indonesian Ahmadiyah, 
and help assist people in need, such as the victims of natural disasters. 
It is difficult to deny that these two contrasting “faces” reflect FPI’s 
activism in the public sphere. However, regardless of the categorization 
of its two faces, FPI views all their collective action as a manifestation 
of “enjoining the good and forbidding the wrong.” FPI equates the 
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“prevention of wrong” as “enjoining the good,” as both are viewed as 
inseparable elements of its ideology. It is important to bear in mind 
that what is valued by FPI may not always be treated as such by the 
public. Similarly, when HTI claimed the establishment of a caliphate 
as a good that needs to be supported, the general public perceived the 
campaign as absurd. The majority of Indonesians view HTI as a threat 
to Indonesia and regard it as a transnational movement that challenges 
the concept of the nation-state and nationalism. 
Consequently, there were at least three reasons the government rep-
resented by the Ministry of Social Affairs for President Susilo Bambang 
Yudhoyono’s (SBY) term agreed to sign the MoU with FPI to renovate 
housing for the poor. First, FPI does not aim to establish an Islamic 
state in Indonesia and has taken concrete actions to assist victims of 
natural disasters in several areas. This has opened a further opportunity 
for the government to cooperate with FPI. Prior to the disbandment of 
HTI by President Joko Widodo’s administration on July 19th, 2017, the 
prospect of SBY’s administration partnering with FPI was higher than 
if it was with HTI because the latter is a transnational movement. Any 
action taken by HTI aimed at delegitimizing the government to pave 
a way for the establishment of a transnational caliphate, which clearly 
challenges Indonesia’s ideological framework. Working with FPI was 
a more viable option than working with HTI. The government also 
realized that, unlike HTI, FPI’s activism, although sometimes inciting 
violence, does not challenge the legitimacy of the state. 
Second, the government acknowledges that FPI programs do “en-
join the good” (‘amar ma’ruf) and thus tried to co-opt FPI not only to 
control its violent tendencies but also to help realize its development 
programs. The former Minister of Home Affairs, Gamawan Fauzi, en-
couraged governors and mayors to involve FPI in the development of 
their localities and regions (Aritonang 2013). FPI’s response to the offer 
was positive. It expressed its willingness to work with the government 
in key areas that benefit society (Rafie 2013).
Third, FPI is one of Indonesia’s largest Islamic revivalist organiza-
tions with many chapters across the country. Furthermore, the majority 
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of the organization’s followers are loyal to their leaders and hold them 
in high regard. This condition is deemed valuable, as FPI can mobilize 
its followers in support of its programs. By engaging with FPI to imple-
ment development programs, such as the “Renovation of Inhabitable 
Houses,” the government benefited from FPI’s volunteers who helped 
renovate houses for the poor in various regions across the country and 
assisted victims of natural disasters.
FUI’s Perception of the Concepts of 
Democracy and the Nation-State
Similar to HTI, FUI believes that democracy is against Islamic teach-
ings. The key difference between HTI and FUI’s perception of de-
mocracy does not lie in democracy’s definition as a concept or idea: 
both agree that the concept is foreign to Islam. The difference lies in 
their views on electoral participation. While HTI avoided becoming 
a political party that competes for seats in the parliament or voting in 
elections, FUI is not opposed to supporting political parties or presiden-
tial candidates. FUI formally supported Jusuf Kalla and Wiranto in the 
2009 presidential election and Prabowo Subianto and Sandiaga Uno in 
the 2019 presidential election (Persada 2018). According to FUI, one of 
the most important reasons behind their support was the candidates’ 
commitment to support FUI’s agenda, such as the disbandment of the 
Indonesian Ahmadiyah (Interview with Muhammad al-Khaththath, 
November 11, 2013).9 
Al-Khaththath said that HTI does not prohibit participation in 
elections. He stated that when he held the position as the Chairman 
(mu’tamad) of HTI in the early 2000s, al-Khaththath asked inter-
national high leader Abdul Qadeem Zallum about HT’s stance on 
electoral participation. The answer al-Khaththath received was that 
elections are permitted (mubah) in Islam. This answer was similar 
to that of HTI’s spokesperson, Muhammad Ismail Yusanto. In prin-
ciple, elections are merely a method for choosing a ruler or leader. 
9 For further detail on FUI’s history, strategies, and dynamics, see Munabari (2017; 2018; 2019).
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HTI has never announced its stance on abstention. As previously ex-
plained, this attitude is due to Indonesia’s election law that stipulates 
preventing individuals from casting their votes is illegal and subject 
to criminalization. 
HTI has a strong influence on FUI’s development of mobilization 
and support-seeking strategies. There are several reasons behind HTI’s 
influence over FUI: first, HTI was the founder of FUI and provided 
a significant part of FUI’s organizational resources before HTI’s with-
drawal from the organization in 2008, not long after the Monas Inci-
dent on June 1st, 2008. Second, those who organize and develop FUI’s 
programs are essentially HTI’s former leaders and members. Not only 
do they inherit HTI’s mobilization and support-seeking strategies but 
also their ideology, including the urgent implementation of Sharia in In-
donesia. However, this ideology has been revised during al-Khaththath’s 
term and those of other FUI leaders. 
The main characteristics of a caliphate include the state’s Islamic 
ideology, Sharia as the only and absolute source of law, and unlimited 
territorial borders, which is antithetical to the nation-state. Unlike a 
caliphate, modern nation-states are bound by territorial borders, which 
separate them from other sovereign nation-states. Furthermore, most 
nation-states have developed according to secular laws, with a small 
number of them implementing Islamic laws. To HTI, none of the Is-
lamic countries today can be categorized as an Islamic state (dar al-
Islam), including Saudi Arabia. This argument is based on the reality 
that none of these countries implement Sharia and are thus categorized 
as un-Islamic states (dar al-kufr). 
HTI’s campaign to establish a caliphate has drawn opposition from 
many Islamic organizations in Indonesia, including NU and Muham-
madiyah, the two largest Islamic mass organizations in Indonesia that 
are moderate in perspective. They have labeled HTI an anti-nationalist 
movement and a threat to NKRI. For example, when HTI held its 
international conference on establishing a caliphate on August 12th, 
2007, in Jakarta, which championed the slogan “It is Time for the Ca-
liphate to Lead the World,” several leaders of the country’s moderate 
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Islamic organizations condemned the campaign to establish a caliphate 
in Indonesia. One of these figures was Solahudin Wahid, a respected 
leader of NU. Solahudin believed that Pancasila, Indonesia’s ideology, 
was compatible with Islam and that the call for the establishment of a 
caliphate was inappropriate (Wahid 2008). Zuhairi Misrawi, another 
Muslim intellectual from NU, said that a caliphate is an unideal form of 
governance and there is no command in Islam for Muslims to establish 
it (Misrawi 2007).
Due to the many opposing views, former members of HTI in FUI, 
coordinated by Muhammad al-Khaththath, tried to revise their strat-
egy for framing the caliphate that they used previously in HTI. After 
his dismissal from HTI, al-Khaththath said that a new group that he 
formed in late 2008, called Hizbud Dakwah Islam (HDI), employed a 
similar ideology to HTI. However, he claimed that, while HTI was led 
by an international leader from the Middle East, HDI was led by al-
Khaththath in Indonesia (Interview with Muhammad al-Khaththath, 
November 11, 2013). This reality shows that, despite the ideological 
similarity between FUI and HTI, al-Khaththath revised HTI’s ideol-
ogy to adapt to Indonesia’s contemporary social-political context. Due 
to the organization’s limited resources, al-Khaththath decided not to 
focus on the development of HDI. Rather, he chose to develop FUI 
and make the organization more effective at engaging with other Is-
lamic groups to promote Sharia in Indonesia. Al-Khaththath believed 
that the establishment of a caliphate was important for implementing 
Sharia (Interview with Muhammad al-Khaththath, November 11, 2013). 
Unfortunately, al-Khaththath attracted other movements’ disapproval 
of his concept of a caliphate. FPI was FUI’s largest member after HTI 
withdrew itself from FUI in 2008. Since then, FPI provided most of 
FUI’s organizational resources, which helped sustain FUI’s collective 
action. Consequently, the call for the establishment of a caliphate no 
longer appeared in FUI’s campaigns. Al-Khaththath then developed a 
new slogan, “NKRI Bersyariah.” The term “NKRI” is short for Negara 
Kesatuan Republik Indonesia, which literally translates to The Unitary 
State of the Republic of Indonesia, while “bersyariah” means “in accor-
302 JURNAL POLITIK, VOL. 5, NO. 2, FEBRUARY 2020
dance with Sharia.” Thus, “NKRI Bersyariah” can be contextually un-
derstood as The Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia that abides 
by or is in accordance with Sharia. 
Variation of Islamic Revivalist Movements’ 
Attitudes and Backgrounds
Table 1 
Variation of Islamic Revivalist Movements’ Attitudes to the 












HTI Agree Disagree Disagree - The current practice of 
democracy is perceived as 
incompatible with Islam.
- The concept of the nation-state 
is perceived as incompatible with 
the Islamic caliphate that HTI 
wishes to establish.




- Democracy is compatible 
with Islam as long as it benefits 
Muslims. 
- FPI regards the establishment 
of an Islamic state in Indonesia 
as unnecessary, as Muslims in 
Indonesia already enjoy the 
freedom to exercise their religion 
and the country already applies 
laws in accordance with Islam, 
such as Sharia-based banking and 
zakat.
MMI Agree Disagree Does Not 
Disagree
- Like HTI, MMI views the current 
practice of democracy as against 
Islamic teachings. 
- MMI prioritizes the full or 
complete implementation of 
Sharia in Indonesia, but not 
necessarily the establishment of a 
caliphate.





- Similar to FPI, FUI supports 
democratic mechanisms, such as 
elections, to fulfill the aspirations 
of Muslims in Indonesia.
- FUI actively conceals its desire 
for the establishment of the 
caliphate and prioritizes its “NKRI 
Bersyariah” campaign. 
Source: Compiled by author from related sources
Although four of these Islamic revivalist movements strongly aspire to 
implement Islamic norms, their attitudes to the nation-state and de-
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mocracy vary. As laid out in the table above, HTI clearly opposes the 
concept of the nation-state and democracy due to its perception of the 
concepts as incompatible with Islam. HTI’s stance contrasts with FPI’s, 
who do not oppose the concept of democracy and the nation-state. 
HTI and MMI hold similar views on democracy but disagree on their 
stances on the nation-state. Meanwhile, FUI, although its formation 
was led by HTI, revised HTI’s ideology on establishing a caliphate. 
Unlike HTI, FUI no longer regards democratic procedures, such as 
elections, as opposed to Islam. FUI agrees with HTI’s concept of the 
caliphate but stopped campaigning for it due to strong resistance from 
various segments of Indonesian society. As explained previously, the 
concept that FUI endorses is “NKRI Bersyariah,” which focuses on 
the implementation of Sharia in Indonesia. This slogan also portrays 
FUI as non-oppositional to NKRI and nationalism, which has been an 
accusation made of HTI.
Several factors that have distinguished HTI from other Islamic re-
vivalist movements, especially on the concept of the nation-state, in-
cluding the following: firstly, HTI was an inseparable branch of the 
international HT in the Middle East. HTI is the only Islamic revivalist 
movement in Indonesia that is led by an umbrella organization in the 
Middle East that also coordinates many branches around the world. HT 
applies a strict organizational structure and ideology to its branches.10 
HTI’s main objective is the reestablishment of an Islamic caliphate, 
like that of the Ottoman, Abbasid, and Umayyad caliphates, which 
were glorious during their time. This objective is promoted and cham-
pioned by HT’s branches around the world, including HTI. Secondly, 
although HTI’s executive board and members are Indonesian citizens, 
HT’s ideology was first introduced to Indonesia in the early 1980s, not 
by an Indonesian citizen, but by a Jordanian HT member Abdurrah-
man al-Baghdadi who later resided in Australia.11 There has been no 
option for HTI members and leaders other than to follow and ascribe 
10 For further detail on the international Hizbut Tahrir network’s history, organization, and 
ideology, see Farouki (1996). 
11 For further detail on the history of HTI’s arrival to Indonesia, see Rahmat (2005). 
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to HT’s ideology and principles. This condition is starkly different from 
other Islamic revivalists, such as FPI. The initiators or founders of the 
movement are Indonesian citizens who ascribe to the religious traditions 
of NU.12 NU is the largest Islamic organization in Indonesia, which 
is also known to be ideologically moderate. The organization is also 
famous for its support for the Pancasila-based NKRI, as established by 
the country’s founding fathers. As a consequence, FPI does not desire 
a caliphate in Indonesia, although the movement commits to “forbid 
and eliminate the wrong” from society.13 FPI’s stance on democracy, 
unlike that of HTI and MMI, views the system as an opportunity to 
promote the aspirations of Muslims in Indonesia through supporting 
candidates who are willing to fulfill Islamic ambitions and “forbid the 
wrong” in society. 
MMI emerged from a preaching community called Badan Koordi-
nasi Pemuda Masjid in the 1990s that held a congress in Yogyakarta in 
2000 with a former Jamaah Islamiyah leader Abu Bakar Baasyir as its 
chairman. Abu Bakar Baasyir is known as a figure at Pondok Pesantren 
Al-Mukmin in Ngruki, Solo, who left for Malaysia due to his refusal 
to acknowledge Pancasila during the New Order in the early 1980s.14 
Baasyir’s refusal was based on the belief that Islam should be the state’s 
ideology. Unlike the FPI, the characteristics of MMI members and fig-
ures do not follow the NU’s religious tradition and thus are not obliged 
to employ a moderate stance on democracy. Even though several of 
its figures, like Abu Bakar Baasyir, state that ideally the Islamic state 
should be regional or transnational, the movement does not call for the 
establishment of an Islamic state in Indonesia and only focuses on the 
full implementation of Sharia.
Despite being initiated by HTI, FUI’s political thought has evolved 
since the dismissal of its General Secretary Muhammad al-Khaththath 
after the Monas Incident on June 1st, 2008, from its original movement, 
12 For further information on Nahdlatul Ulama, see Fealy and Barton (1996) and Bush (2009), 
among others.
13 For further detail on FPI’s history, organization, and ideology, see Ng (2005) and Jahroni 
(2008). 
14 See Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (2001). 
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HTI. The most important aspect that differentiates HTI from FUI is 
its stance on democracy due to Muhammad al-Khaththath’s position as 
FUI’s ideologist. If democracy is referred to as a method to choose one’s 
leader, unlike HTI, al-Khaththath believes that elections are permitted. 
Furthermore, in line with FPI’s stance, al-Khaththath nominated him-
self as a Partai Bulan Bintang candidate in the 2014 legislative elections 
and was unsuccessful at gaining a seat in the legislature. Meanwhile, as 
mentioned above, although FUI believes that the establishment of an 
Islamic caliphate is an obligation, it chooses to not vocalize the aspira-
tion to avoid resistance or conflict with other Islamic organizations in 
Indonesia.15
CONCLUSION
This study aimed to answer the question, “how do the four Indonesian 
Islamic revivalist movements (HTI, FPI, MMI, and FUI) perceive the 
concept of democracy and the nation-state?” This research employed 
a qualitative approach and obtained data through conducting observa-
tions, interviews, and a literature review. The results of this research 
show that, although the four Islamic revivalist movements studied agree 
that Sharia should be implemented in Indonesia, their stances on the 
concept of the nation-state and democracy differ. For example, HTI 
criticizes both of the concepts. HTI argues that the ideal state and 
system of governance in accordance with Islam is a caliphate. To FPI, 
Indonesia is an Islamic country, and thus, there is no need to call for an 
Islamic state. FPI also supports democratic mechanisms, such as elec-
tions, under the condition that they can be used to secure the interests 
of Muslims in Indonesia. Similar to FPI, FUI also does not campaign 
for the establishment of an Islamic state in Indonesia and may also sup-
port certain electoral candidates as long as they are willing to further 
the aspirations of Muslims. Meanwhile, MMI employs a similar stance 
to HTI. MMI disagrees with the concept of democracy, but it does not 
call for the establishment of an Islamic caliphate. 
15 For further information on FUI’s history, strategy, and dynamics, see Munabari (2017; 2018; 
2019).
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Although not the main focus of this study, several things can be 
used to explain the differences between the four revivalist movements. 
Their differences may be attributed to the origins of the movements 
(i.e., whether they originate from Indonesia or not) and their founders 
and initiators. Differences attributed to the origins of the movements 
can be seen in FPI and HTI, while the founders or initiator factors 
are a visible difference between FPI, MMI, and HTI. The differences 
in religious ideology or thought may be attributed to the movements’ 
origins and founders. Further research on which factors influence each 
movements’ perceptions and attitudes to Sharia and democracy is en-
couraged to determine the extent or degree of influence these aspects 
have on each movement’s ideology and strategy. 
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